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A MR. SWARTWooD was the president of a corporation engaged
in the business of running a flour mill. In 1919 the company's
credit became shaky. To enable it to secure grain for its busi-
ness, Mr. Swartwood entered into a writtca contract with a
grain commission house, whereby he guaranteed the payment
of "any and all sums of money" requested by the corporation
and furnished by the commission house, until further notice.
Large sums were furnished. The corporation later became bank-
rupt, and a balance of $40,000 for these advances remained
unpaid. The commission house sued Mr. Swartwood upon his
guaranty, and. he contended that it was orally agreed, at the
time, that the guaranty should apply only to sums furnished for
the purchase of grain by the milling company locally, at the
small town where its mill and elevator were situated, whereas
the sums sued for were advanced for purchases of grain in the
Minneapolis market, to be shipped to the mill. At the trial, a
jury accepted this contention, and judgment followed that the
plaintiff take nothing from Mr-. Swartwood. To the appellate
court, however, Mr. Swartwood's defense was quite unacceptable,
because of the "rule which prevents the destruction of the obli-
gation of a written contract by evidence of preceding or con-
temporaneous oral agreements." Significantly, the court added:
"Without that rule there would be no assurance of the enforce-
ability of a written contract. If such assurance were removed
today from our law, general disaster would result, because of
the consequent destruction of confidence, for the tremendous but
closely adjusted machinery of modern business cannot function
at all without confidence in the enforceability of contracts." 1
The court assumes as self-evident that without some special
assurance of the enforcement of contracts as written, as against
claims of inconsistent oral agreements, business men generally
will be seriously handicapped in the prosecution of commercial
enterprise. Like most of the law's basic assumptions, this one
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has never been tested by any survey of the actual effects in
business of the presence or absence of such assurance.' But
there can be little doubt that a belief in the soundness of this
apprehension has been one of the chief motives of judges in
the development and preservation of the nexus of doctrines called
by the name of the Parol Evidence Rule. Despite the probable
importance to the business world of some reliable guaranties
of the integrity of written transactions, the difficulties in extend-
ing such protection are apparent in a country where, by law
and common habit, nearly all kinds of agreements wnay be oral,
and where disputed fact-claims are ordinarily left to the arbitra-
ment of a group of twelve men, not selected for any special
competence for the task of judging.
When an issue arises involving choice between a writing and
an alleged oral agreement, usually the one who sets up the spoken
against the written word is economically the under-dog. He
may be a person who has signed a note at the bank for himself
or his neighbor and who asserts that it was agreed that the
note or endorsement should not be enforced until certain funds
should be realized by the debtor, or he may be a farmer who
has purchased a tractor on credit and who resists collection on
the ground that the agent of the tractor company orally war-
ranted the power-rating of the tractor in a way not specified
in the written sales agreement. The types of transaction wherein
is involved this kind of competition between claims based upon
writings and those based upon alleged oral agreements dealing
with the same affair, are infinitely various, but usually if there
is a difference between the two parties in economic status, the
one who relies upon the writing is likely to be among the
"haves," and the one who seeks escape through the oral word
will probably be ranged among the "have nots," in Sancho
Panza's classification. The average jury will, other things being
equal, lean strongly in favor of the side which is threatened with
possible injustice and certain hardship by the enforcement of
the writing.
"The written word remains," a genuine and veracious me-
morial, so far as it goes, of what was actually agreed to. On the
other hand, the narrative by a witness of the purported sub-
stance of words, spoken many months or even years before, is
2 It would, perhaps, be worth while to canvass the managers and counsel
of business enterprises of country-wide scope, to ascertain whether they
are aware of the lack of strictness of the courts of a few of the states (e.g.,
North Carolina) in protecting writings against claimed oral agreements,
and, if so, whether this influences the amount and methods of business done
by them in those states. Local studies of the operation of the rule are
Dean W. G. Hale's excellent article, The Parol Evidence Rule (1925) 4 Onn.
L. REv. 91; and Chadbourn and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in
North, Carolina (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 151.
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'subject to a very high probability of error,3 even when recounted
by a disinterested person. It is doubtful whether a jury is likely
to take sufficient account of this factor of unreliability. More-
over, the witness who recounts the oral bargaining seldom is,
in fact, disinterested. He is usually the party himself, who is
struggling, honestly or dishonestly, to escape, the hardship of
the terms nominated in the bond.4 The struggle is all too often,
consciously or unconsciously, the father of the recollected con-
versation. From all these sources springs grave danger that
honest expectations, based upon carefully considered written
transactions, may be defeated through the sympathetic, if not
credulous, acceptance by juries of fabricated or wish-born oral
agreements.5 Likewise, some peril to justice and to the stability
of business transactions lies in the possibility that earlier and
tentative oral agreements which were a part of the preliminary
- parleying, but were actually understood by both parties to be
abandoned when omitted in the final written agreement, will
be stoutly asserted by one party at the trial as having been in-
tended to stand alongside the writing. When a genuine, but
superseded, oral agreement is thus set up, it will be even harder
for the jury to reject the claim based on such agreement than
if it were fabricated from the whole cloth.
The danger of undermining confidence in written bargains
generally is one which can be appreciated by a trial judge, who
looks back on many similar cases and is trained to take a long
view. Moreover, he is likely, during his practice, to have imbibed
some understanding from his clients of the needs of business,
and to know from extended observation how to discount testi-
3 Coke reports Popham, C. J., as saying, in the Countess of Rutland's
case: "Also it would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by
advice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of
the agreement of the parties, should be controlled by averment of the
parties, to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory." 3 Co.
51 (1604).
It is possible that the protection which it afforded to writings may have
served to lengthen the life of the archaic and irrational rule which dis-
qualified parties from testifying.
5 To recognize these dangers is not to overlook the corresponding dangers
on the other tack. V~hen a written contract has, after lengthy negotiations,
been prepared for signing, and a term orally agreed upon has been omitted
or distorted by the scrivener, an oral assurance that "it will be all right"
may often serve to gloss the matter over to a signature, especially where
the contingency provided for in the oral understanding seems remote. The
party may hesitate to delay matters by insisting on having the writing
amended. Especially is this true today, when many transactions are con-
summated by standardized printed contracts. These are tendered by agents
who are often instructed by their principals not to permit the written forms
to be altered, even when, as so often happens, they do not fit exactly the
individual requirements of the customer. Cf. Llewellyn, Wkat Price Con-
tract? (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 704, 747.
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mony for the warping of self-interest. The jury, on the other
hand, is likely to pass over these considerations in its urge of
sympathy for a party whom the shoe of the written contract
pinches. This sympathy may occasionally deflect even the de-
cision of the trial judge who sees, and often personally knows,
the harassed party. The appellate judge, remote from local ac-
quaintance and local political interest, is free to adopt a still
closer approach to the Jovian detachment of the "long view."
The continental legal system, with no civil jury, and with most
contracts required to be entirely in writing, has little trouble
in guarding written bargains from oral encroachment. This
danger to written transactions is peculiarly inherent in the com-
mon-law methods of trial. How did the common-law judges
make provision against this danger, which, as we have seen,
flows chiefly from the peculiar institution of the untrained jury,
a body numerous enough to invite emotional organ-playing by
counsel, and usually unguided in this country by any specific
advice from the trial judge? The danger from allowing juries
to do their worst with written transactions was doubtless sensed
intuitively by the judges," but this was prevented from emerg-
ing into consciousness and expression by the prevailing idolatry,
sincerely enough entertained by the judges themselves, of the
jury as a symbol of political liberty., Otherwise, they might
frankly have reserved for the judge's decision (as one of the
exceptions to the general practice) the question of fact as to
G That the parol evidence rule chiefly stems from an anxiety to protect
written bargains from re-writing by juries, is confirmed by the compara-
tive freedom which was allowed in chancery in respect to reformation, and
in regard to oral variations asserted as a ground for denying specific per-
formance. Of the latter, a recent example is John T. Stanley Co., Inc. v.
Lagomarsino, 49 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). It is true that other
doors for jury intervention in support of oral variations have not boon
closed, as in the case of oral agreements that the writing shall not go into
effect until the happening of a condition, and likewise oral agreements
modifying the written terms after the execution of the document. Each of
these escapes from the writing presents difficulties to the one who attempts
it, and, in any event, the fact that protection in some situations has not
been perfect, does not disprove the desire to furnish it generally,
7Mr. Justice Blackstone, for example, in his Commentaries (3 BL. COiDmi.
294, *379), begins his eulogy thus: "Upon these accounts the trial by jury
ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the
English law. . . . It is the most transcendent privilege which any subject
can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his property,
his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his
neighbours and equals. A constitution, that I may venture to affirm has,
under Providence, secured the just liberties of this nation for a long suc-
cession of ages. And therefore a celebrated French writer (Montesq. Sp.
L. xi. 6), who concludes, that because Rome, Sparta, and Carthage have
lost their liberties, therefore those of England in time must perish, should
have recollected that Rome, Sparta, and Carthage, at the time when their
liberties were lost, were strangers to the trial by jury."
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whether an alleged oral agreement set up in competition with
a writing, was actually made, and, if so, whether it was in-
tended to be abandoned or to survive, when the writing was
signed. Forbidden this straight path by their own preconcep-
tions, by a zig-zag route they. came out near the same goal.
The approach was made through doctrinal devices which gave
no hint of any departure from the usual division of functions
between judge and jury, but which were subtly convenient for
jury control in cases where written transactions were threatened
by claims of agreed oral variations not credited by the judge.3
In the first place, they said, "Parol evidence is inadmissible
to vary, contradict, or add to the terms of a written instru-
ment." The phrase becomes a shibboleth, repeated in ten thou-
sand cases. It obviously enables the judge to head off the diffi-
culty at its source, not by professing to decide any question as
to the credibility of the asserted oral variation, but by professing
to exclude the evidence from the jury altogether because for-
bidden by a mysterious legal ban. An alternative device to the
same end was the use of the formula that when a writing (vari-
ously qualified) is executed, it is "conclusively presumed" to
embody the whole agreement. If conclusively presumed, then,
of course, no evidence of additional oral agreements can be
heard. This all-inclusive prohibition by rule of law against any
competition of oral agreements with -written was effective
enough as a jury-excluding formula, but as an actual standard
of decision for judges it was wholly illusory.
Thus, for example, some writings are obviously mere skeleton
memoranda, not intended to cover all the terms agreed on, and
where this is so, the oral terms must be provable, if elementary
justice is to be done. But in revising the original formula against
"varying, altering, or contradicting" by recognizing an excep-
tion for mere partial memoranda, or incomplete instruments,
care had to be taken not to open the door to jury-determination
as to whether the exception was applicable. The exception was
sought to be stated in terms of the "completeness" of the writ-
ing. The writing is the "sole criterion" of its own completeness,
they said, and the judge, traditionally literate and hence trained
to interpret writings by inspection, ascertains whether it is
s It is not intended to suggest that these doctrinal devices were newly
invented by the judges, consciously, to meet this need, in modern times.
Thayer anq Wigmore have traced too clearly the origin of the parol evi-
dence formula against "varying the writing," to a primitive formalism
which attached a mystical and ceremonial effectiveness to the carta and
the seal. (5 WIGmoRE, EVMENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2426.) The writer merely
ventures to submit that this formalism, abandoned elsewhere in so many
areas of modern law, had here a special survival value-the escape from
the jury-which led the judges to retain for writings the conception that
they had a sort of magical effect of erasing all prior oral agreements.
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"complete on its face." 9 Thus far the reins are still tightly
held by the judges. But the doctrine of exclusive resort to the
writing (even as mitigated by the exception for obviously skele-
ton memoranda), while useful in aiding the judges to retain
command, is much too narrow to meet the actual need for recog-
nition of reasonable and genuine oral agreements dealing with
matters related to those covered by the written document, but
not intended by the parties to be superseded by the writing,
even though the writing, so far as appearance goes, is seemingly
a formal and completed one. Two devices were used to meet
this need, without opening the door to blundering by the jury
in the china-shop.
First, the language devised for the obviously sketchy mem-
oranda, to the effect that the incompleteness was to be measured
by the instrument "on its face" and hence, though this was
seldom mentioned explicitly, was for the judge to determine
himself by inspection, was repeated. "The only criterion of the
completeness of the written contract ... is the writing itself." 10
It soon became evident, however, that while the face of the writ-
ing would usually show whether it was intended as a mere
memorandum, and not as a plenary instrument at all, yet a
mere inspection could never show whether a writing, full and
deliberate in form, did or did not cover all the agreements en-
tered into by the parties about the subject-matter. Consequently,
in these latter cases the door had to be opened wider if any
thing at all was to come in. So the formula was revised: The
writing is still the sole criterion by which to determine whether
it is "complete," but it is the writing considered in the light
of all the surrounding circumstances. All, that is, except one.
You may consider the entire situation leading up to the sign-
ing of the writing except the most crucial of all data, i. o., the
purport of the alleged agreement which has been left out of
the writing.11 Of course, no trial judge has ever actually fol-
lowed any such practice of barring the door to an alleged oral
agreement without first asking the mysterious stranger to
identify himself. Counsel will always be asked to detail the na-
ture of the oral agreement desired to be proved, or the evidence
of its terms will be admitted de bene until a final ruling on its
admissibility is made.12 The artificiality of the elaborations of
OBrautigam v. Dean, 85 N. J. L. 549, 556, 89 At. 760, 763 (1914);
Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885).
10 Ibid. 377, 26 N. W.. at 2.
33 Wheaton Roller-Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mfg. Co., 66 Minn. 156, 160,
68 N. W. 854 (1896).
i Other courts, in revulsion from this narrow formula, that the "com-
pleteness" of the writing is to be determined from the face of the writing
itself, have proceeded to the opposite extreme. They say that if it appears
in evidence that oral agreements were made, and not included in the writ-
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this doctrine of what we might call "facial completeness," and
its falsity as a picture of what the trial judge actually does,
result from the clumsiness of "completeness" as a doctrinal
vehicle. It carries very well the relatively easy cases dealing
with skeleton memoranda and with contracts or conveyances
where some essential or almost universally customary term is
omitted from the writing. It collapses when the courts burden
it with the heavy freightage of cases where the writing shows
no such obvious deficiency and where the underlying doubts are
whether the alleged oral agreement really was made and, if so,
whether the writing was intended to displace it.
A more practical and workable expedient for the admission
of oral agreements considered by the judge as probably genuine
and probably intended to remain in effect alongside the writing
was the importation here of the term "collateral." The word,
through long usage in other connections, had acquired a rich
patina of technical legalism. Consequently, it would not occur
to any one to suggest the submission to a jury of the question
whether an alleged oral warranty by a landlord (at the time
of making a written lease) that the drains of the house were
in good order, was "collateral" to the lease. 3 Apparently, the
idea of allowable collateral agreements has enabled judges to
follow their common sense and instinct for justice by furnish-
ing them an escape from the formula against "varying, con-
tradicting, or adding to" the writing, when a litigant seeks to
establish an oral agreement which might reasonably have been
intended to stand after the -writing was signed.
II
The older techniques thus far described have served several pur-
poses fairly well. The "rule of evidence" against "varying" the
writing by "parol" enabled the judge to cut out at the outset
-by excluding evidence-mischievous claims of dubious oral
agreements. He could thus protect investments founded on
written bargains. The "exception" for "incomplete" writings,
for "collateral" oral agreements, or the even wider escape-valve
used by some courts of "contracts partly oral and partly writ-
ing, it then follows that the writing is "incomplete," and if incomplete,
then the parol evidence rule does not apply. See Exum v. Lynch, 188 N. C.
392, 125 S. E. 15 (1924). Though this reasoning has been justly criticized
(4 PAGE, CONTRACTS (1920) § 2153, n. 8), it seems a more logical applica-
tion of the "completeness" standard than the doctrine which would require
"completeness" to be ascertained without examining the alleged oral agree-
ment, by the omipsion of which the writing is claimed to have been left
incomplete. The difficulty lies in the inadequacy of "completeness" as a
standard.
13 See De LaSalle v. Guildford, L. R. 2 K. B. 215 (1901).
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ten," permitted the genuine supplementary oral bargains to be
recognized and enforced. The rough-and-ready phrases about
"varying the writing" of the seventeenth century English judges
are elaborated in the appellate opinions of the American courts
of the last hundred years, and these same formulas thus come
to serve as the handles by which the appellate courts may revise
the results reached both by judge and jury below. 14 A judge
who finds a line of opinions which repeat the formula that "a
writing may not be varied by parol" and also another equally
respectable parallel line of opinions repeating the refrain that
"when a writing is partly written and partly oral, the oral part
may be shown," 1r is in the situation, happy for the probable
interests of justice in that individual case, where he can decide
either way and for either decision can justify himself to counsel
and parties by invoking an unimpeachable rule.1" Nevertheless,
the doctrines of the previous cases, thus mutually inconsistent
and "paired," have furnished him no more guidance than did
the famous 'house-rule, "Do as you please," to the novices of
the Abbaye-Tfilime.
Likewise, convenient as this dark and tortuous ritualism was
in enabling the trial judge to retain control over issues not safe
to be trusted to the jury, yet the veiled inconsistencies and irra-
tional mysticism of this protective phraseology which is draped
around the written document begin to impart a sense of uneasi-
ness to Anglo-American legal scholars in the emerging rational-
ism of the latter half of the last century. For example, in 1876,
Sir James Fitz-James Stephen, after having stated in traditional
terms the rule against varying the writing, thus rationalizes the
doctrine of "collateral" oral agreements: "The party may prove
14 See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) c. 14.
15 Greenleaf apparently first made this lion and lamb lie down together.
As appears from the following passage, courts gladly repeated the miracle:
"The rule is unquestioned that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict
or vary the terms of a valid written instrument: 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCI
(16th ed. 1899) § 275. But it is equally well settled that the rule does not
apply 'in cases where the original contract was verbal and entire, and a
part only of it was reduced to writing.' Ibid. § 284, a; 2 PARSONS ON CON-
TRACTS (5th ed. 1866) 553, note." Cobb v. Wallace, 5 Coldwell 539, 544
(Tenn. 1868). A similar pairing of opposites is strikingly disclosed in the
opinion of the court in Exum v. Lynch, supra, note 12. The contradiction
was bared in the following judicial comment: "If we may go outside of the
instrument to prove that there was a stipulation not contained in it, and
so that only part of the contract was put in writing, and then, because of
that fact, enforce the oral stipulation, there will be little value loft in the
rule itself." Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288, 294 (1885).
10 This availability on occasion of two categorically opposite rules has
been often noticed. Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44
HARv. L. REv. 697, 704; Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, ibid. 1222;
W. W. Cook, The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Prob-
lem (1928) 5 LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics (N. Y. B. A.) 335.
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the existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter
on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent
with its terms, if, from the circumstances of the case, the court
infers that the palties did not intend the document to be a com-
plete and final statement of the whole of the transaction between
them. .... ,, 17
The greatest task of the new theory-builder is to tear away
the shaky walls of the old structure. James Bradley Thayer,
the great pioneer in the rationalization of the rules of evidence,
struck his axe in deep at this point. Though he saw clearly
enough "that the older law and the older decisions... were often
mainly concerned in keeping matters out of the hands of
juries," is he was offended at the device of treating the protective
rule as an "evidence rule." This ran counter ta the central
theme around which Thayer arranged all his teaching about the
subject of evidence-the dogma that a rule of evidence is not
one which defines obligations but which operates to exclude
relevant evidence. Doubtless this classification usually makes for
clear thinking. It serves to segregate for unified treatment the
rules of exclusion which are built around the weaknesses of
juries from the mass of substantive rules which incidentally
result in excluding evidence of t-ahsactions that they render
ineffective. Doubtless, also, the parol evidence doctrine fails to
fit into this category of rules of evidence with any comfort.
Nevertheless, though excluded from the family fold of rules
of evidence, it can claim common ancestry in distrust of the
jury.
Thayer was not content with charging that the parol evidence
rule was misbranded when called a rule of evidence. He tells
us that it is a rule of the substantive law defining contracts,
deeds, judgments, or the like. Doubtless, in a sense, this is true.
What is the rule of substantive law which, as between prior
oral expression and later written deed or contract, selects the
effective part of the transaction? Wigmore, in one of the most
brilliant chapters of his great treatise, shows the relation be-
tween the process whicb he calls "integration" and the whole
body of doctrine relating to the creation of jural transactions
generally.19 So far as any widely applicable modern principle
may be stated, it is that the terms of the transaction (contract,
deed, or the like) are to be obtained from the intention of the
parties as revealed by their conduct and language. Among
several expressions from which such an agreement or other jural
17 STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1901) arL 90.
Is THAYEP, PRELimixARY TREATIsE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CozLrMO LAw
(1898) 409.
19 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, c. 86; cf. Strahorn, The Unity of the
Parol Evidence Rule (1929) 14 MINN. L. REv. 20.
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act is sought to be derived, an earlier tentative expression will
be rejected in favor of a later expression intended as final. This
would be true obviously if both the earlier and the later expres-
sion were oral.2 0 It is but a simple application of this rationale,
to say that where an earlier tentative oral expression is followed
by a later writing, then if the writing was intended to supersede
the earlier expression, the law gives it that effect. This, in effe~t,
is the theory of "integration." It is simple and rational and sets
up no special rule for writings different from that applicable
to transactions wholly oral. Is it possible that to this clear
residuum may be reduced the formidable parol evidence rule,
of which Thayer said, "Few things are darker than this, or
fuller of subtle difficulties"?
The writer takes leave to suggest that while this generaliza-
tion that the later writing will supersede the earlier oral ex-
pression, if the parties so intended, is accurate enough, and is
doubtless best classified as a rule of substantive law and not
as a rule of evidence, yet it is not the most significant phase
of the obscure and complicated technique for protecting writings
which has traditionally gone by the name of the parol evidence
rule. Indeed, the formula would, of itself, extend no special pro-
tection to writings at all: As before suggested, a later oral
expression, if so intended, would as completely supersede all
prior negotiations as an "integrating" writing would. So far as
this formula suggests, the question of whether the writing was
intended to supplant earlier expressions would be assumed to
go, in case of dispute, unreservedly to the jury in the normal
course. Such a picture of the parol evidence doctrine, it is
submitted, throws the high-light upon its family resemblance to
the substantive rules for the creation of jural acts, but leaves
in the shadow the rugged features distinctive to and character-
4stic of this phase of judicial administration at the common law.
This throwing of light on the family relationship was a notable
achievement, which rescued the. parol evidence doctrine from
the dark avenues of mystery. There is danger that the peculiar,
and probably valuable, function which it performs in giving a
special protection to writings may be under-emphasized and
neglected, and thus become atrophied and finally lost.
That function, of course, is procedural. It is the reservation
in the trial judge of a special and added authority over the
20 Compare the following passage from the judgment in Kain v. Old, 2
B. & C. 627 (1824): "Where the whole matter passes in parol, all that
passes may sometimes be taken, together as forming parcel of the contract,
though not always, because matter talked of at the commencement of a
bargain may be excluded by the language used at its termination. But if
the contract be inthe end reduced into writing, nothing which is not found
in the-writing can be considered as a part of the contract."
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question: Was this writing intended by the parties to displace
this asserted oral term or agreement, if there was any such
oral expression? Thayer was entirely aware that the parol
evidence doctrine had been used by the judges to serve this pur-
pose,2 1 but his main preoccupation was with the pioneer job
of driving the parol evidence rule out of the "evidence" fold.
Wigmore explicitly recognizes this special allocation of authority
to the trial judge,2 2 but he cites no decisions to the point and
apparently treats it as a minor and incidental feature of the
subject. Williston, in his lucid and realistic treatment of the
matter, follows, in the main, the lines laid down by Thayer and
Wiginore. Like them, he touches but casually this question of
"Who decides whether the document was intended to supersede
that alleged oral agreement?"-a question which will be decisive
of the result in most actual cases of competition between an
alleged oral agreement and a written document. By couching his
discussion of "collateral" oral agreements in terms of "admis-
sibility," 23 however, he reverts to the earlier "rule-of-evidence"
phraseology. He implies that the "court" passes on the question
of whether fhe parties intended the signed document to displace
the alleged oral agreement by the mechanism of determining,
at the outset, whether he will permit the evidence of the alleged
oral agreement to be considered by the jury at all.
Wigmore, after stating that this question of intent is for the
judge-a proposition which in its frank and naked delegation of
the decision of a fact-issue to the judge might cause uneasiness
to traditional-minded courts-suggests, in tentative presump-
tion-form, a formula which tends somewhat to narrow the fact-
inquiry. He says:
"In deciding upon this intent, the chief and most satisfactory
index for the judge is found in the circumstance whether or
not the particular elevient of the alleged e,:trhwsic giegotlation
21 See THAYER, op. cit. supra, note 18, at 401, 409.
22 5 WIGORE, op. cit. gupra note 8, § 2430, at 308: "Whether a par-
ticular subject of negotiation is embodied by the writing dcpcnds wholly
upon the intent of the parties thereto.... This intent must be sought where
always intent must be sought (ante, §§ 42, 1714, 1790), namely, in the
conduct and language of the parties and the surrounding circuzstances ....
There is a preliminary question for the judge to decide as to the intent of
the parties, and upon this he hears evidence on both sides; his decision
here, pro or con, concerns merely this question preliminary to the ruling
of law. If he decides that the transaction was covered by the writing, he
does not decide that the excluded negotiations did not take place, but merely
that if they did take place they are nevertheless legally immaterial. If he
decides that the transaction was not intended to be covered by the writing,
he does not decide that the negotiations did take place, but merely that
if they did, they are legally effective, and he then leaves to the jury the
determination of fact whether they did take place."
23 2 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 638, 639.
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is dealt with at all in the writing. If it is mentioned, covered
or dealt with in the writing, then presumably the writing was
meant to represent all of the transaction on that element; if it
is not, then probably the writing was not intended to embody
that element of the negotiation." 24
Williston makes an extremely significant contribution by
formulating a still more flexible and usable rubric, as follows:
"The test of admissibility is much affected by the inherent
probability of parties who contract under the circumstances in
question, simultaneously making the agreement in writing which
is before the court and also the alleged parol agreement. The
point is not merely whether the court is convinced that the par-
ties before it did in fact do this, but whether parties so situated
generally would or might do so." 25
This, as will be observed, is given as a test of admissibility,
that is, of action by the judge. This formula is paraphrased
in the Contracts Restatement, which provides that the writing
does not displace the oral agreement if the latter is not incon-
sistent with the writing and is such "as might naturally be made
as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties
to the written contract." 28
III
A recent Pennsylvania case, Giarni v. R. Russel & Company,2 1
is almost unique in that the court, in dealing with this problem
made skillful use of the ideas of this modern group of law
writers. A room in an office building in Pittsburgh was leased,
with the provision that it should be used "only for the sale of
fruit, candy, soda-water," etc., and, further, "that the tenant
is not allowed to sell tobacco in any form." The tenant con-
tended that, in the negotiations for the lease, and as an induce-
ment to his signing, it was orally agreed by the landlord's agent
that the tenant should have the exclusive privilege of selling
soft drinks in the building. The tenant sued for damages for
breach of the oral agreement, in that the landlord permitted
others to sell drinks. At the trial, the agent denied that any
such oral agreement was made. The tenant had judgment below.
On appeal, the court, by Schaffer, J., said:
24 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 23, § 638.
25 2 WILLSTON, op. cit. supra note 23, § 638.
2
0 CONTRACTS RESTATE ENT No. 5 (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 236 (1) (b).
27 281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924); for an extensive collection of other
cases see Note (1931) 70 A. L. R. 752.
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"When does the oral agreement come within the field embraced
by the written one? This can be answered by comparing the
two, and determining whether parties, situated as were the ones
to the contract, would naturally and normally include the one
in the other if it were made. If they relate to the same subject-
matter, and are so interrelated that both would be executed at
the same time and in the same contract, the scope of the sub-
sidiary agreement must be taken to be covered by the writing.
This question must be determined by the court.... We have
stated on several occasions recently that we propose to stand
for the integrity of written contracts.... We reiterate our posi-
tion in this regard. The judgment of the court below is reversed,
and is here entered for defendant."
This opinion signalizes a new judicial willingness to search
for a sound engineering technique in dividing the load between
judge and jury in law-suits where alleged spoken words are
set up in rivalry with written words. It challenges us to an
examination of the feasibility of some of the available expedients.
First, the crude, older method of choice by the trial judge
between the rule against "varying, altering, or adding to, a
writing," and the formulas for "incomplete writings" and "col-
lateral contracts," with the real motives for the choice left almost
inarticulate, while it furnished the needed protection to writ-
ings, is specious and outworn. It falsely couches in terms of
a technical rule of exclusion of evidence a device for giving spe-
cial power to the judge to determine at the threshold fact-ques-
tions (Was the oral agreement made? Was it abandoned?) upon
which the genuineness of the alleged oral terms, as part of the
final bargain, depends.2 s
Second, we may advocate the plan of resolving the whole mat-
ter into one of the application 'of the standard of expressed
intent, with no special treatment for written transactions, except
this, that the trial judge shall determine as a preliminary fact-
question whether a given alleged oral agreement was intended
by the parties to be abandoned when the writing was signed.
This solution has the merit of comparative simplicity, welcome
after a century of obscurantism about "contradicting" writings.
28 Compare the rule that when the genuineness of the writing itself is
challenged all that the trial judge requires, before admitting the writing,
is only a prinm facie showing. If the adversary's evidence raises a dis-
pute, the issue is for the jury. Hamsher v. Kline, 57 Pa. 397 (186S);
Flournoy v. Warden, 17 Mlo. 435 (1853). For discussions of the functions
of judge and jury in dealing with fact-questions which condition the ad-
missibility of evidence under technical rules of exclusion, see Maguire and
Epstein, Prelinzinary Questins of Fact in. Determining the Admissibility of
Evidence (1927) 40 HARV. L. REv. 392; Morgan, F2inctins of Judge and
Jury in the Determination of Prelminary Questions of Fact (1929) 43
HARv. L. Rnv. 165.
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It has behind it the great authority of the Wigmore treatise. It
presents these difficulties, however. In the first place, judges are
reluctant to avow an assumption of control over the ascertain-
ment of intent, so traditionally associated with jury-responsi-
bility in the fields of crime, tort and contract. It is significant
that even the enlightened opinion in the Gianni case, though
quoting approvingly from the section of the Wigmore treatise
which contains the statement that the question is one of intent,
and is for the judge to decide, does not quote that statement,
but prefers rather to place the question in the judge's hands in
terms of what would normally have been done by parties in
these circumstances. A further, and overriding, objection is
this: the intention formula leaves out of account the principle
need for a special hand-on-the-rein by the judge. This need is
that of striking down at the outset claims of oral variants on
the writing, variants which in fact the judge believes never
were entered into but are fabrications, designed or unconscious.
As already suggested the real service of the parol evidence
doctrine is here. Seldom from the cases does one gain the im-
pression that the dispute is really over whether an admitted
oral agreement was intended to be superseded by the writing.
Where the adversary's position is to be gleaned from the report,
which is surprisingly seldom, it appears most often that he denies
that any such oral counter-agreement was ever entered into.
Where the judge's real doubts are on this score, little help is
derived from a formula which directs attention solely to whether
-assuming it to have been made-the oral agreement was in-
tended by the parties to be superseded. It is comparable to the
situation where a judge is called on to consider whether a cer-
tain copy of a document meets the requirements of the best
evidence rule, when the real issue is whether the original docu-
ment from which it was copied is not itself a forgery.
But a third course naturally presents itself. Why set up any
special safeguards here? Treat the question of the genuineness
of the alleged oral agreement and that of the parties' intention
to supplant it by the document, as other fact-questions are
treated. Let the trial judge use the same machinery for control
of the jury which he always has available. If, in his opinion,
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion from the evi-
dence, he is empowered to withdraw that question from the jury.
Perhaps if judges were called upon habitually to use this device
in the speech-versus-document situation, it would lend itself
readily enough to the adequate protection of written transactions
from the vagaries of juries. As such situations offer themselves
to the trial judge, however, one party testifies that an agree-
ment outside the writing was made, and that it was understood
that this outside agreement was to be binding, together with
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the writing. Naturally, a trial judge-especially a timid, elec-
tive one-would shrink from a ruling that reasonable men could
not believe this direct assertion on the stand. We are here in
the realm of the vaguest opinion, where every conclusion is over-
weighted with the individual experiences and preconceptions of
its advocate. With due realization of this, the writer believes
that the usual formula for jury-control is inadequate here, and
that the traditional reservation of a.special and added power
in the judge is desirable.
There remains a fourth expedient. As foreshadowed in the
above discussion, the writer urges its claims as the most accept-
ably fashioned for use by our present judges with our present
juries. The expedient suggested is this: Let the trial judge,
after hearing the testimony as to the alleged oral agreement,
including the evidence of substantiating circumstances, compare
it with the terms of the writing, and if he considers that it is
one which parties situated as these were would "naturally and
normally" have recited in the writing itself, had they made it
and intended it to stand, then he will reject the evidence thus
tentatively heard. On the other hand, if (in the terms of the
Resftevwnt) he concludes that the alleged oral pact is "such
an agreement as might normally be made as a separate agree-
ment by parties situated as were the parties to the written con-
tract," then he will allow the evidence to go to the jury.- 3 In this
way, the argument on the objection or motion to exclude will
be aimed at abstract impersonal probabilities, and the ruling wfll
not brand any witness as a liar. He will still, if he admits the
evidence and the proof is conflicting, submit to the jury the
issues: was the oral agreement made as claimed, and, if so, was
it intended to be displaced by the written terms? C9
29 Of course, by familiar process, in transactions of standardized pattern
and frequent recurrence in litigation, the judges narrow the range of
judgment by seeking to treat the cases of each type uniformly. Thus, in
a given jurisdiction, we find numerous such rules as that oral agreements
to treat a deed as a mortgage may be shown, or that oral agreements that
an indorser is to be treated as a co-maker, may, not. A similar crystalliz-
ing process, accompanied by a counter-process in which, from time to time,
some of the crystals are dissolving again into fluid, is characteristic of
the administration of justice under wide general concepts, such as "rea-
sonable care," "fraud," "judicial power" and id omne gemis.
30 Dean Hale suggests in the following passage still another possible
device: "The basic evils of the rule in its present form are, first, that it
is a pretense, and second, that the collateral inquiries which arise when-
ever it confronts the court are artificial, capricious and arbitrary. The
cure. Let the parol evidence rule be phrased and operate as a rule of
presumption. When the terms of an agreement have been reduccd to writ-
ing by the parties, let it be presumed that the writing contains with e.xact-
ness and completeness all those terms, but allow this presumption to be
overcome by clear and convincing proof to the contrary." Hale, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 122. This leaves, however, the manner of jury-control
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The anaesthetic qualities of the language-technique about "con-
tradicting," "admissibility," and "completeness" which the
courts have inherited, and the pre-occupation of the great text-
writers, Thayer, Wigmore, and Williston, with the substantive
aspect of the parol evidence doctrine, have contributed to the
almost complete absence in the reported appellate opinions of
any real discussion of the practical administrative problem of
division of power between. judge and jury. Doubtless the tradi-
tional practice of handling the matter at the trial as one of
admissibility, without any jury-intervention, has become so com-
pletely second nature to judges and lawyers that it would rarely
raise a query. Certainly, the appellate opinions almost uni-
versally assume that there is no fact problem but solely a legal
point as to admissibility of evidence under a technical rule. In
the rare instances of attempts by counsel to invoke a jury hear-
ing on some issue relating to the oral agreement, or of claims.
on appeal that the trial judge has improperly checked resort to
the jury, the appellate courts have, in perhaps a majority of
cases, said that the question of whether the writing "expressed
the whole agreement," or was "complete," 31 is for the trial judge.
An early and unequivocal pronouncement is that of the New
Jersey court in Naumberg v. Young.32 In that case a tenant of
a factory building sued the landlord for breach of an oral guar-
anty that the engine and boiler in the leased building were in
repair and were adequate for the tenant's business. The trial
court heard this evidence, but, it appearing that there was a
written lease which was silent on the subject, the plaintiff was
non-suited. In affirming this result, the upper court, in refer-
ence to the parol evidence doctrine, said:
"Undoubtedly this rule of evidence presupposes that the par-
ties intended to have the terms of their agreement embraced
in the written contract. If it was designed that the written
contract should contain only a portion of the terms mutually
agreed upon, and that the rest should remain in parol, the parties
have not put themselves under the protection of the rule, But
in what manner shall it be ascertained whether the parties in-
tended to express the whole of their agreement in the written
contract? The question is one for the court, for it relates to the
admission or rejection of evidence." 13 (italics mine.]
somewhat uncertain. Must the evidence be "clear and convincing" to the
judge before he may admit the evidence of the outside oral expressions
for consideration by the jury, or should he admit it for jury-appralsal,
simply instructing them not to act on it unless "clear and convincing"?
31 Of course, these are alluringly simplified ways of saying that the
parties have intended to supersede the oral agreement, if made, with the
document.
3244 N. T. L. 331 (1882).
33 Ibid. 338.
EVol. 41
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The Supreme Court of the United States plumped decisively
on the same side,^4 and dict. or decisions upholding the power
of the trial judge to determine whether the writing is "com-
plete," "contains the entire agreement," or was intended to
supersede the oral negotiation, have come from Pennsylvania,
Connecticut,3 and California.37 Other cases are not classifiable
- Seitz v. Brewers' Refrig. Co., 141 U. S. 510, 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 40, 48
(1891) (Oral warranty of machinery asserted against written contract of
sale, which contained no warranty. The trial court directed a verdict
against the claim of warranty. Affirmed. "Whether the written contract
fully expressed the terms of the agreement was a question for the
court . . ."). The court did not mention an intercsting decision of tl-e
previous year (Bank of British North America v. Cooper, 137 U. S. 473,
11 Sup. Ct. 160), in which the question arose at the trial whether certain
cable transfer-bills given by a bank to a customer were decisive as to the
terms of the agreement. On appeal, the court said: "Such bills may or
may not be the contract. They may be nothing more, and intended to
be nothing more, than memoranda or receipts. Whether they are the
entire contract or simply in the nature of receipts is not a question of
law for the court, but one of fact for the jury." Watkins Salt Co. v.
Mulkey, 225 Fed. 739 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915), follows the Seitz case. Of
similar effect is South Florida Lumber Mills v. Breuchaud, 51 F. (2d)
490, 493 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931), wherein it was held that the trial judge
correctly declined to submit to the jury the question whether earlier oral
agreements were superseded by the writing. The interesting opinion, by
Hutcheson, circuit judge, adopts the "intention" test on the authority of
the Wigmore treatise, and says that its application is "primarily" for the
trial court.
3; Gianni v. Russell, supra note 27.
- Brosty v. Thompson, 79 Conn. 133, 136, 64 At. 1, 2 (1906) ("For the
trial court," but it does not appear whether there was a jury); Pyskoty
v. Sobusiak, 109 Conn. 593, 145 At. 58 (1929).
- Harrison v. McCormick, 89 Cal. 327, 26 Pac. 830 (1891) (Written
contract for sale of "Montana lump" coal, with no mention of sample. De-
fendant, when sued for price, seeks to show that it was orally agreed that
the coal would equal coal previously furnished. Admitted. Judgment for
defendant. Held, error: "The question whether a writing is upon its
face a complete expression of the agreement of the parties is one of law
for the court. . ."); Thoroman v. David, 199 Cal. 386, 249 Pac. 513 (1926)
(A contract to sell house and land was in the form of written escrow in-
structions to a title guaranty company. There was no reference in the
writing to the furniture in the house. Plaintiff, the purchaser, sued for
the furniture. The trial judge admitted plaintiff's testimony that the
furniture was orally agreed as included. Defendant's witnesses testified
in denial. At the trial, apparently without a jury, the court found that
the furniture was included. Held, on appeal, that the evidence of the oral
agreement was inadmissible, and that the finding was unsupported. The
court quotes the above excerpt from the Harrison opinion); Stephan v.
Lagerqvest, 52 Cal. App. 519, 199 Pac. 52 (1921) ("Whether writings
which pass between parties contain the complete contract which they have
made is a question of law, and is to be determined from the face of the
instruments . . ."). Seemingly contra, is the language of the opinion in
Luitweiler Co. v. Uldah Co., 16 Cal. App. 198, 207, 116 Pac. 707, 711
(1911), affirmed by the Supreme Court, without adopting the opinion, 16
Cal. App. 198, 116 Pac. 712 (1911).
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with entire certainty but seem to lend countenance to this view."'
Perhaps it is not fanciful to detect the strongest leaning in
this direction in those courts which have been least affected by
the Jacksonian cult of judicial elections for short terms. At all
events, the earliest expression to the contrary comes from the
vicinity of the Hermitage. In Cobb v. Wallace,3 an action was
brought for conversion by the wrongful detention of a coal
barge. The barge belonged to the plaintiff, who loaded it with
coal and sold the coal to the defendants. Defendants gave a brief
receipt for the coal and barge, which contained a promise that
the defendants would pay $3 per day "until the barge is re-
turned." The evidence showed that it had been orally agreed
that the barge should be returned as soon as the coal was un-
loaded at destination. Instead, the defendants kept the barge
and hired it out to others. The trial judge charged the jury that
the oral contract "could not be looked to," and that under the
terms of the writing "the contract for the use of the barge
would not be terminated until the defendant so elected." On
appeal, the court, in the course of an extended opinion, in which
several errors were pointed out, said: "The plaintiffs had the
right to have the question, whether the parol contract had been
made as alleged, and whether the writing introduced embraced alt
the terms of such previous parol contract, [italics mine] sub-
mitted to the jury; and it was error in the court to withdraw
this question of fact from the jury, and to decide it itself." The
receipt was apparently intended as a mere partial memorandum,
so that, in any view, it seems that the trial judge erred in in-
structing the jury to disregard the alleged oral agreement. Of
course, if the evidence of the oral agreement was competent, but
the making of the oral agreement was disputed, it was for the
jury to determine that dispute. But the italicized phrase is the
first suggestion (so far as the writer has discovered) that the
jury is to decide, free from preliminary intervention by the trial
judge, whether the writing was intended to supplant all prior
negotiations. ° How far the court meant to go in this decision
38 Offutt v. Doyle, 135 Ky. 296, 122 S. W. 156 (4) (1909); Ft. Worth
& D. C. Ry. v. Wright, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 234, 70 S. W. 335 (1902);
Standard Scale & Supply Co. v. Baltimore Enamel and Novelty Co., 136
Md. 278,-110 Atl. 486 (1920). See also McNeeley v. McWilliams, 13 Ont.
App. Rep. 324, 330 (1886), and the discussion of this and other Canadian
cases, by Professor MacRae, in 4 CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST (Ont.
ed. 1928) 803.
30 5 Coldwell 539 (Tenn. 1868).
40 The same confused assumption that the jury must determine both
whether the writing was exclusive, and, if not, whether the alleged oral
agreement actually was made, appears in a later Tennessee case. I-lines
v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 159, 33 S. W. 914, 916 (1896) ("The question
as to whether the entire contract was reduced to writing, or an independ-
ent collateral agreement was made, was a question of fact, and wvhero
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is questionable. It gave only a side-glance at this minor point,
unnecessary as it was to the disposition of the case.
As is customary, the idea is uncritically adopted by the en-
cyclopedias,4' and from them in a sprinlding of judicial opin-
ions.-' Conceivably, all that some of the opinion writers who
place this question in the jury's hands mean to suggest is that
after the judge has approved the oral agreement as one which
might normally stand with the writing, he should still leave to
the jury to say whether these parties actually did intend to
supersede the oral agreement. If so, they are unobjectionable.
Always, however, the treatment is casual, the traditional and
seemingly contrary view is ignored, and the extent to which
the courts mean to go in turning the question over to the jury
is beclouded by the language that the jury must say whether
the writing "contains the entire agreement." This may mean,
whether the writing was intended to supersede the oral agree-
ment or, less probably, it may mean, whether there was in fact
any oral agreement at all outside the writing.
In this comparison, the balance of clear-cut judicial opinion
would seem to incline toward the traditional practice, approved
by the Federal Supreme Court. But, at best, the handling of the
question is haphazard and oblique.
A rehash of contradictory clich6s, worn smooth with unthink-
ing repetition since they were first culled from the pages of
Greenleaf, is the substitute which most opinions offer for fresh
and realistic consideration of the problem. In this unsatisfactory
state of the judicial pronouncements, it seems highly desirable
that the current draft of the restatement of the doctrine by the
American Law Institute should be amended, to make clear the
function of the judge in its administration 3
there was any evidence to sustain the contention, it was a matter for the
jury to determine, and not for the court.").
4" E.g., 6 R. C. L. 55; 22 C. J. 1291.
42Gordon v. Curtis Bros., 119 Ore. 55, 248 Pac. 158 (1926). In Hirsch
v. Salem Mills Co., 40 Ore. 601, 604, 67 Pac. 949, 68 Pac. 733 (1902), the
question of -whether the oral contract survived the writing was held to
be one of "fact" not determinable on the pleadings, but only "by a trial
ald upon testimony," but this does not quite mean that the jury must
decide it. Two interesting Massachusetts cases may be thought to indicate
a tendency toward the enlarged view of the jury's function, but in Thomas
v. Barnes, 156 Mass. 581, 31 N. E. 683 (1892), the writing was not signed
by the party who asserted the oral contract, and in Corey v. Woodin, 195
Mass. 464, 81 N. E. 260 (1907), the question of intention to supersede
the oral contract with the writing, which was treated as a jury-question,
related to a novation rather than an "integration."
43Perhaps the draft section of the RESTATEhENT op CoNT, ,cs, as
quoted above (p. 376), might appropriately be revised by adding the words
in brackets: "Sec. 236. An oral agreement is not superseded . .. by a
subsequent . . . integration . . . if the agreement . . . (b), is such an
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If the parol evidence doctrine is to be administered chiefly
by juries and not by judges, its special protection for written
transactions dwindles and fades. Perhaps such special protec-
tion is no longer needed. The telephone, and the urgent call for
high speed in certain types of important transactions, such as
security trading, have accustomed business men to rely upon
word-of-mouth, and to dispense with the safeguard of writing.44
And conceivably, jurors, in this day of universal education, are
more able and willing to sift critically and intelligently testimony
about oral negotiations preceding a writing. Perhaps, on the
contrary, it might be thought that the jury, even assuming a
personnel more intelligent than that of fifty years ago, is less
adequate than ever, in view of the increased demands of present-
day litigation. Certainly, the jury was never lower in general
esteem.45 Again, while business men more often make great
agreement as [in the opinion of the trial judge] might naturally be made
as a separate agreement....1"
This is suggested in a letter from Professor Nathan Isaacs, from
which I take the liberty of quoting: "In the first place, the business man
of today relies and must rely less and less on writing than he did even
fifty years ago. The telephone has something to do with this change, but
a more important factor is the speed required in modern business. It is
true that our facilities for rapid writing have increased, but our need for
rapidity in transactions has increased much more rapidly. The result is
that the business man is accustomed to seeing millions of dollars worth
of securities change hands on the stock exchange without the scratch of
a pen. But this is not the whole or even the most important part of the
story. Even where writing is resorted to two forces have conspired to
prevent the writing from containing or even purporting to contain the
"whole" contract. One of these is the growing complexity of transactions,
and the other is a phase of the speed already mentioned which shows itself
in the brevity of business letters and other memoranda.
"To fill the gaps which necessarily result in the modern business contract,
we resort more and more to the standardizing elements (customs, statutesq,
rules of trade associations, chambers of commerce, exchanges), but a great
many blanks still remain to be filled in by oral understanding. The real
danger therefore to the business man that comes from a strict enforce-
ment of the parol evidence rule, is that as contracts are made today es-
sential parts are in danger of being excluded. In other words, I mean to
suggest that however fitting the parol evidence rule may have been when
it grew up, it is not in strict accord with the needs of business today. It
is a gratuitous assumption that where people take the trouble to reduco
their contract to writing their motive is to prevent explanations-even
contradictory explanations-from entering into the situation. On the con-
trary, the motive for writing may be the very simple motive of satisfying
the need of quick communication or of making a memorandum in such a
form as to fit into the plan of a business for having the memorandum acted
on, or it may be some quite different motive."
4' See, as reflections of some current opinion, GREEN, JuDaE AND JURY
(1930) c. 15; FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 179, 180. Even
trial lawyers in active practice before juries are occasionally voicing
skepticism about the value of the jury-system. F. H. Peterson, Commonts
on Trial by Jury (1926) 10 LAW NOTES 188; T. D. Samford, How to Piolo a
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decisions orally, because of the urge for speed, yet today, more
generally than ever before, business men, when there is no cry
for haste, reduce their transactions to writing.
Around considerations such as these should center the discus-
sion which will shape the future evolution of the parol evidence
doctrine. The protection afforded by that doctrine will wax or
wane as the judge or the jury takes the upper hand in its admin-
istration. The presently fashionable portrayal of the doctrine
throws the spot-light upon its obvious substantive aspect. The
procedural side, with its apportionment of duties between the
bench and the jury box, must be rescued from the shadows.
Jury (1928) PROC. ALA. ST. BAR ASS. 135, 143; McCall, ibid. 35, 30; ST,%L-
mASTE, WHAT PRICE JuRY TRIALS? (1931).
